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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-LIMITATION
OF THE PARENTAL RIGHT TO CONSENT-In re Scott K., 75 Cal.
App. 3d 162, 142 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1977), rev'd, 24 Cal. 3d 395, 595
P.2d 105, 155 Cal. Rptr. 671, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979).
I.

INTRODUCTION

re Scott K.l concerns the arrest of a seventeen-year-old mi
nor for possession of marijuana. In 1976, Scott's mother found
some marijuana in his desk drawer and turned the marijuana over
to the police. 2 The police notified Scott's father of the impending
arrest and requested his cooperation. Scott's father consented to
the police officers' plan to apprehend Scott in the garage. He also
told the police that they would be welcome inside the family resi
dence after the arrest. 3 The police, lacking an arrest warrant, pro
ceeded with this plan.
Mter the arrest, the police entered Scott's home. They
searched Scott's bedroom without a search warrant but with his fa
ther's consent. Scott did not object to the search until the police
discovered a locked toolbox. Scott possessed the only key to the
lock. He initially refused to surrender the key; however, he
changed his mind when the police informed him that they had
been given permission to break the box open if a key was not
provided. The search of the toolbox disclosed nine small plastic
bags containing marijuana. 4
At Scott's adjudicatory hearing,5 the trial court decided that
the arrest was illegal because no exigent circumstances existed to
circumvent the requirement that the police obtain an arrest war
In

1. 24 Cal. 3d 395, 595 P.2d 105, 155 Cal. Rptr. 671, cen. denied, 444 U.S. 973
(1979).
2. Id. at 398-99, 595 P.2d at 106, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 672.
3. Id. at 399, 595 P.2d at 107, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
4. Id.
5. A juvenile adjudicatory hearing differs from a criminal proceeding in that its
purpose is to correct the transgressions of the youthful offender by benevolently in
stilling a sense of parental supervision. See In re Schubert, 153 Cal. App. 2d 138, 313
P.2d 968 (1957).
The proceeding for declaring a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court is not a
trial. The minor is relieved of the stigma of criminal conviction through the adminis
tration of corrective guidance. See In re Steiner, 134 Cal. App. 2d 391, 285 P.2d 972
(1955).
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rant prior to making the arrest. 6 Nonetheless, the evidence se
cured in the seizure of the toolbox was found to be admissible. The
court concluded that such evidence was not tainted 7 as the product
of an illegal ~rrest. Rather, the search was an act independent of
the arrest and resulted from both the mother's initial overtures to
the police and the father's willingness to allow further inquiry into
the matter.8 The court evaluated the evidence and determined that'
Scott had violated section 11359 of the California Health and Safety
Code. 9 Since Scott was a minor, the court, consistent with section
602 of the Welfare and Institute Code,10 adjudged him a ward of
the court and placed him on probation.
Scott appealed l l his case to the state appellate court 12 on the
ground that the evidence obtained should have been suppressed. 13

6. 24 Cal. 3d at 399, 595 P.2d at 107, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 673; see People v.
Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 545 P.2d 1333, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929
(1976). "[W]arrantless arrests within the home are per se unreasonable in the ab
sence of exigent circumstances. . . . '[E]xigent circumstances' means an emergency
situation requiring swift action to ... forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or
destruction of evidence." Id. at 276, 545 P.2d at 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
7. The exclusionary rule of evidence operates to bar the admission of evidence
which is illegally obtained by the state. As the decision in Scott K. indicates, such
tainted evidence may result from an illegal search; however, the application of the
rule is not limited to the fourth amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
See also In re Donnie H., 5 Cal. App. 3d 781, 85 Cal. Rptr. 359 (1970). A minor's oral
statements made during his custodial interrogation were properly suppressed in a
proceeding to declare him a ward of the court. The statements concerning his com
mission of two felonies were made without knowledge of his right to counsel and his
right to remain silent. Id. at 789-90, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65.
8. 24 Cal. 3d at 399, 595 P.2d at lO7, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
9. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11359 (West Cum. Supp. 1980). Section
11359 provides: "Every person who possesses for sale any maijuana, except as other
wise provided by law, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison."
10. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West Cum. Supp. 1980). Section 602 pro
vides:
Any person who is under the age of eighteen years when he violates
any law of this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or
county of this state defining crime ... other than an ordinance establishing a
curfew based solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court,
which may adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.
Id.
11. Appellant is entitled to review of errors in the adjudication proceeding on
appeal from the judgment. See In re William C., 70 Cal. App. 3d 570, 577, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 843, 849 (1977). See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); note 47 infra.
12. In re Scott K., 75 Cal. App. 3d 162, 142 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1977), rev'd, 24 Cal.
3d at 395, 595 P.2d at 105, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 671. The full appellate opinion is
reported only in the California Reporter.
13. Id. at 400, 595 P.2d at 107, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 673. When a party seeks to
exclude tainted evidence from a proceeding, he brings a motion to suppress the
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The majority opinion affirmed the lower court ruling, stating that
the solution to juvenile misconduct resides within the family and
that the courts should not tie the hands of well-intentioned parents
who seek to correct their child's improper behavior.14 This asser
tion of parental authority over the minor's claim of fourth amend
ment protections 15 became a focal point of the California Supreme
Court's determination on the merits.
The California Supreme Court reversed the appellate court
decision,16 holding that fourth amendment protections should be
extended to minors. The court distinguished between a warrantless
police search and a private search executed under the guise of pa
rental authority. 17 Since state action was found to be present in the
search of the toolbox, the court decided that the minor was enti
tled to protection against unreasonable police conduct. 18 The ma
jority of the justices, in granting safeguards against police impropri
eties, was confident that the effect of the decision would not
compromise the efforts of parents to maintain a strong family hier
archy.19
The state supreme court decision discusses several important
aspects of the relationship between a minor and the government.
The court's analysis included inquiries into the extent to which
evidence in question. See In re Robert T., 8 Cal. App. 3d 990, 88 Cal. Rptr. 37
(1970). A policeman tricked a minor into allowing him to enter an apartment. Since
there was never any consent to the entry, the adjudication of delinquency based
upon the secured evidence was held to be invalid. Id. Although the minor let the po
lice enter the premises, his action did not constitute consent since the right to
consent to a search had not yet been extended to juveniles. See note 114 infra and
accompanying text.
In the case of Scott K., the California Supreme Court extended to minors the
fourth amendment right of excluding tainted evidence from adjudicatory proceed
ings. 24 Cal. 3d at 402-03, 595 P.2d at 109, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 675. See also note 7
supra.
14. 142 Cal. Rptr. at 63.
15. The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The California Supreme Court based its decision on protec
tions springing from the California state constitution. See note 25 infra and accompa
nying text.
16. 24 Cal. 3d at 405,595 P.2d at 111, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 677.
17. Id. at 400 n.2, 595 P.2d at 107 n.2, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 673 n.2.
18. Id. at 402,595 P.2d at 108-09, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 674-75.
19. Id. at 400-03, 595 P.2d at 108-09, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 674-75.
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rights against unreasonable searches and seizures are afforded to
juveniles, the limitation which the parent-child relationship places
upon the extension of these rights, and the degree to which par
ents may waive these rights. The court resolved these issues by
merging both state law and federal constitutional precedent.
The United States Supreme Court has extended to minors
many of the procedural guarantees 20 it has afforded to adults; how
ever, this extension has never included fourth amendment protec
tions. This results, in part, from the Court's reluctance to decide
questions affecting the parent-child relationship in the home.
While the Court has been unwilling to question the right of par
ents to maintain discipline over their children in the family set
ting,21 the rights of the parent have given way to the power of the
government where children have been threatened with exploitation
in the public sphere. 22 Since fourth amendment questions arise
more frequently in the privacy of the home, the Court has been
able to assert this dichotomy as a basis for refusing to entertain
questions involving family matters arising in the home.
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has nar
rowed the scope of fourth amendment rights, as they pertain to
adults, by permitting a broader interpretation of the concept of
third-party consent. 23 Under this new formulation, it is difficult to
determine who may validly give consent since the test24 measures
20. While the United States Supreme Court has not considered the issue of
fourth amendment rights in the context of the juvenile hearing, other rights have
been extended to juveniles. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (right to be
judged by a beyond a reasonable doubt standard); Tinker v. Des Moines School
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (first amendment rights); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967)
(right to counsel, the right to confront witnesses, the right against self-incrimination,
and the right to fair notice of charges). See also notes 35-39 & 47-59 infra and accom
panying text.
2l. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (allowing parents to di
rect the course of their child's education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(permitting parents the right to raise their children). See also notes 69-77 infra and
accompanying text.
22. See Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding law forbidding
the sale of pornographic literature to minors); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944) (prohibiting parents from publicly exploiting their children by forcing them to
engage in religious activities). See also notes 69-77 infra and accompanying text.
23. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (a woman could consent
to the search of a bedroom that she shared with the defendant). See also notes 24 &
86-104 infra and accompanying text.
24. The standard for determining a valid third-party consent is based upon the
principle of common authority.
Common authority is, of course, not to be implied from the mere prop
erty interest a third party has in the property. The authority which justifies
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the degree of accessibility the consenting party has to the searched
item. Since the Court has offered no clear resolution to the prob
lems at issue in Scott K., the California Supreme Court broadened
the scope of inquiry by considering the precedents of other state
courts in an effort to interpret the parameters of its own state con
stitution. 25

II.
A.

DUE PROCESS AND

PARENS PATRIAE

Historical Background

The similarities between the criminal and juvenile justice sys
tems make it necessary to consider their inherent distinctions. The

the third party consent does not rest upon the law of property, with its at
tendant historical and legal refinements, see Chapman v. United States, 365
U.S. 610 (1961) (landlord could not validly consent to a search of a house he
had rented to another), Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (night hotel
clerk could not validly consent to search of customer's room) but rests rather
on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or
control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the
co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and
that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit
the common area to be searched.
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974). See also note 92 infra and ac
companying text.
25. The California Supreme Court decided the Scott K. case on the basis of ar
ticle I, § 13 of the state constitution. 24 Cal. 3d at 400, 595 P.2d at 108, 155 Cal. Rptr.
at 674. This provision states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated;
and a warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
and things to be seized.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13. See als(, note 15 supra.
This distinction is significant since the United States Supreme Court cannot re
view a state court's interpretation of its own state law as long as that interpretation
does not restrict a federally created right. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62
(1967) (specifically discussing the fourth amendment issue); Jankovich v. Indiana
Toll Rd. Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487, 491-92 (1965).
The decision in Scott K. in no way restricted any federal rights. If anything, the
case broadened the scope of fourth amendment protections afforded to individuals.
Traditionally, the California Supreme Court has employed this tactic to broaden rights
in the absence of United States Supreme Court initiative. See generally People v.
Krivda, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973) (search and seizure
case); Rios v. Cozens, 9 Cal. 3d 454, 509 P.2d 696, 107 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1973) (viola
tion of due process); Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400
P.2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965) (claim of equal protection violation).
Pursuant to an appeal by the State of California, the United States Supreme
Court tentatively docketed the case of In re Scott K. as No. 79-226. This petition for
a writ of certiorari was denied on November 26, 1979.444 U.S. 973 (1979).
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juvenile justice system derived from the English common law,26 a
body of law which furthered the maintenance of both a strong nu
clear family and a dominant parental leader.27 The government's
assumption of an interest in minors corresponded to the develop
ment of compulsory education programs which tended to introduce
children into the public sector.28 As a result, the government
sought to emulate the role of the parent in the public sphere. A
separate, nonadversarial court system was developed in order to
satisfy the special needs of children. 29 The government's practice of
assuming a parental role in the public domain became known as
parens patriae. 30
Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the juvenile justice sys
tem evolved as a corrective, rather than a punitive, institution. 31
26. See Fox, Philosophy & the Principles of Punishment in the juvenile Court,
8 FAM. L.Q. 373, 376 (1974); Geiser, The Rights of Children, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1027,
1031 (1977).
27. See Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and the
State Part II, 4 FAM. L.Q. 410, 413 (1970). Parental power probably cannot be de
fined except as a residue of all power not lodged elsewhere by the law. Id. See gen
erally Hafen, Puberty, Privacy, & Protection: The Risks of Child~en's "Rights," 63
A.B.A.J. 1383 (1977).
28. See Project, Education and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights,
74 MICH. L. REV. 1373, 1383-84 n.43, 1388 (1976).
29. See Garlock, "Wayward" Children and the Law 1820-1900: The Genesis of
the Status Offense jurisdiction of the juvenile Court, 13 GA. L. REV. 341, 345-46
(1979); Comment, The juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909) (general discus
sion of the evolution of the juvenile justice system).
"The idea of a juvenile court certainly was not the development of a juvenile
criminal court. It was to have a healthy specialized clinic, not to conduct criminal
trials in evasion of the Constitution and Bill of Rights." DeBacker v. Brainard, 396
U.S. 28, 38 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
30. Parens patriae refers to the broad concept whereby the state assumes pro
tective jurisdiction over minors. The theory applies in cases of public delinquency as
well as in cases of parental neglect. See Jensen v. Sevy, 103 Utah 220, 237, 134 P.2d
1081, 1089 (1943). When viewed in this context, the primary purpose underlying the
doctrine of parens patriae is the maintenance of the child's safety and well-being.
See Chandler v. Chandler, 56 Wash. 2d 399, 404, 353 P.2d 417, 420-21 (1960).
Generally, courts have been hesitant in overruling precedent supporting the no
tion of the traditional family hierarchy. In most cases, the child's best interests are
presumed to be synonymous with those of his parents. It is only when parents fail in
their child rearing obligations that judicial intervention in the areas of delinquency
and child abuse becomes necessary. Even so, the courts have been reluctant to con
sider the child's welfare as different from that of his parents. See Geiser, supra note
26, at 1031-32. See also notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
It appears that the decision in Scott K. signals a departure from rigid adherence
to parental supremacy in the privacy of the home. See also note 75 infra and accom
panying text.
31. See Dobson, The juvenile Court and Parental Rights, 4 FAM. L.Q. 393, 397
(1970).
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Since the system imposed no real sanctions, there was no apparent
need for constitutional protections. 32 As enacted, the system at
tempted to provide for all a child's legal needs: parental protection
inside the home was coupled with passive governmental attention
outside the home. 33 It was believed that the adoption of parens
patriae would obviate the need for procedural safeguards.
The legitimacy of a system based entirely upon parens patriae
came into question at the time due process guarantees were being
extended to adults in criminal matters.34 The first departure from
strict adherence to parens patriae occurred when a minor was tried
as an adult and was convicted on the basis of his testimony taken in
juvenile court. 35 Under this circumstance, it became evident that a
total denial of rights at the waiver hearing36 could unduly prejudice
the minor's opportunity to obtain a fair and impartial trial. -The
question of which rights attached during the waiver hearing was

32. See Comment, supra note 29, at 109-10.
33. Id. at 1l0.
34. The extension of procedural due process rights reached its height during
the latter years of the Warren Court. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (fourteenth amendment provided that states must adhere to fifth amendment
protections against self-incrimination; therefore, a defendant had to be made aware
of his right to remain silent); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (fourteenth
amendment provided that right to counsel included right to meet with retained attor
ney prior to trial); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (extended rights to
counsel in noncapital cases to the states, via the fourteenth amendment); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to the states as protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures).
35. See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 V.S. 49 (1962). In Gallegos, a 14-year-old was
arrested for robbery and assault and was committed to a reform school. When the
victim of the robbery subsequently died, the boy was charged with murder and tried
as an adult. He was convicted on the basis of the confession he had made in juvenile
court. In reversing, the United States Supreme Court stated, "Without some adult
protection against this inequality, a 14-year-old boy would not be able to know, let
alone assert, such constitutional rights as he had." Id. at 54 (majority opinion by
Douglas, J.).
36. Waiver hearings are conducted by the juvenile court to determine whether
the minor should be tried as an adult defendant. Section 606 of the CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE (West 1972) provides:
When a petition has been filed in a juvenile court, the minor who is the
subject of the petition shall not thereafter be subject to criminal
prosecution-based on the facts giving rise to the petition unless the juve
nile court finds that the minor is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with
under this chapter and orders that criminal proceedings be resumed or insti
tuted against him.
For additional discussion concerning the fitness of juveniles to stand trial in
criminal matters, see generally Comment, Juveniles in the Criminal Courts: A Sub
stantive View of the Fitness Decision, 23 V.C.L.A. L. REV. 988 (1976).
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raised in Kent v. United States. 37 In Kent, the United States Su
preme Court decided that, with regard to waiver proceedings, the
minor is entitled to "the essentials of due process and fair treat
ment. "38 While the Court held that such a hearing need not con
form to all the requirements of a criminal trial,39 the decision did
cast doubt upon the validity of a system which asserted parens
patriae as a rationale for excluding all procedural rights. 40
While the Court still adhered to the basic assumption that
children and adults should be treated differently under a dual legal
system, a line of cases emerged tending to obscure this distinc
tion. 41 The first such case, In re Gault,42 held that during an
adjudicatory hearing a minor is entitled to the right against self
incrimination,43 the right to counsel,44 the right to notice of char
ges,45 and the right to confront witnesses. 46 The Court considered
the possibility of extending other related procedural rights 47 but
chose instead to confine its holding to the facts as presented. 48 This

37. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
38. [d. at 562.
39. [d. The California courts do not consider subsequent criminal prosecutions
as a violation of the juvenile's right against double jeopardy. The rationale is that
since juvenile hearings are not criminal matters, the minor is not subject to criminal
sanctions twice for the same offense. People v. Silverstein, 121 Cal. App. 2d 140,
142-43,262 P.2d 656, 657 (1953).
40. While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of juve
nile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious questions as to
whether actual performance measures well enough against theoretical pur
pose to make tolerable the immunity of the process from the reach of consti
tutional guaranties applicable to adults. There is much evidence that some
juvenile courts ... lack the personnel, facilities and techniques to perform
adequately as representatives of the State in a parens patriae capacity, at
least with respect to children charged with law violation.
383 U.S. at 555-56.
41. See notes 42-58 infra and accompanying text.
42. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
43. ld. at 55.
44. ld. at 41.
45. [d. at 33-34.
46. ld. at 57.
47. Gault concerned the arrest and subsequent confinement of a minor who
had been charged with making obscene phone calls. The Arizona courts failed to
provide any of the protections mentioned in the text accompanying notes 43-46 su
pra. In granting a writ of habeas corpus, the United States Supreme Court discussed
the minor's right to a transcript of the proceedings and the right to appellate review;
however, the Court chose not to reverse on these grounds. [d. at 57-58.
48. Gault was concerned only with the adjudicatory phase of the hearing. "We
do not even consider the entire process relating to juvenile 'delinquents.' For exam
ple, we are not here concerned with the procedures or constitutional rights applica
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self-imposed restriction effectively limited the Court's ability to de
fine the "totality of the relationship"49 between the minor and his
government,
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have attempted to pro
vide guidance in the area of procedural rights through a process of
selective incorporation. 50 In addition to the fifth and sixth amend
ment guarantees provided in Gault, the Court has extended to mi
nors first amendment rights,51 as well as the right to be proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 52 The Court fashioned a test for
the extension of due process rights in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania: 53

ble to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor do we direct our attention
to the post-adjudicative or dispositional process." Id. at 13.
While Gault did not discuss the dispositional phase of the juvenile process,
there is support for the contention that certain rights should be extended in commit
ment proceedings when the state is involved. See In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 569
P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977).
The serious consequences attendant upon involuntary commitment of a
minor as a mentally ill or disordered person, and the significant potential for
error in diagnosis convinces us that a minor who is mature enough to partici
pate intelligently in the decision to independently assert his right to due
process iIi the commitment decision must be pennitted to do so.
Id. at 929, 569 P.2d at 1291, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 303. See also Comment, The Mental
Hospitalization of Children a~d the Limits of Parental Authority, 88 YALE L.J. 186
(1978).
49. 387 U.S. at 13.
50. An analogy can be made between the method implemented by the United
States Supreme Court in the area of juvenile law and the means employed in the ex
tension of due process rights to defendants in criminal matters instituted by states.
See notes 51-58 infra. See also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
The development of due process rights from the federal government to the states
seemed to be a necessary prelude to eventual extension of those rights from adults to
children: "If the Fourteenth Amendment has absorbed [the federal Bill of Rights] ... ,
the process of absorption has had its source in the belief that neither liberty nor jus
tice would exist if [it] ... were sacrificed." ld. at 326. See also In re Scott K., 24 Cal.
3d at 401 n.4, 595 P.2d at lOB n.4, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 674 n.4. See note 20 supra.
51. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Students were sus:
pended from school for wearing ann bands to protest the Vietnam War. The Court
held that a passive demonstration came under the protections of first amendment
rights to free speech. ld.
52. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). A boy committed an act that, if done by
an adult, would have constituted larceny. Since the offense was of a criminal nature,
the child's adjudication of guilt had to be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt.
ld.
53. 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (the right to a jury trial is not constitutionally required).
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan indicated that the right to a jury trial in
an adjudicatory proceeding was not necessary as long as it was compensated by the
inclusion of some other right: "[T]he states are not bound to provide jury trials on
demand so long as some other aspect of the process adequately protects the interests
that Sixth Amendment jury trials are intended to serve." ld. at 554.
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"the applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings as
developed by Gault and Winship is fundamental fairness. "54
While many of the due process protections have been granted to
minors, not all these protections can be extended if the system is
to remain nonadversarial. 55 Thus, for example, the right to trial by
jury has been denied because of the inherently formalized confron
tation that such a procedure necessarily entails. 56 The inclusion of
a jury might frustrate the goals of a system in which benign legal
counseling must be combined with swift disposition of cases. 57 By
according to the child most of the privileges and withholding from
him most of the sanctions, the courts can better inculcate a con
structive appreciation for the legal process. 58

B.

Analysis

The first issue the California Supreme Court addressed in In
re Scott K. 59 was whether the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures should be extended to minors. 6o Since the
United States Supreme Court has not considered the fourth
amendment as it relates to minors, the states are free to decide the
matter individually.6! Policy considerations support the extension
of fourth amendment rights to minors. The theory underlying both
the fourth and fifth amendments is exclusionary in nature. Gener
ally, the fourth amendment rights take effect prior to the proceed

54. Id. at 543. For a discussion of the standard of fundamental fairness in a pro
cedural due process context, see Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
Is it a fundamental principle of liberty and justice which inheres in the
very idea of free government and is the inalienable right of a citizen of such
a government? If it is, and if it is of a nature that pertains to process of law,
this court has declared it to be essential to due process of law.
Id. at 106. See also note 50 supra.
55. 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE, A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND
MENT § 1.5, at 88-89 (1978).
56. But see In re Carl W., 15 Cal. 3d 271, 285, 539 P.2d 807, 816, 124 Cal. Rptr.
47, 56 (1975). While the California State Constitution does not require jury trials for
trials for juveniles, under extraordinary circumstances, advisory juries are permitted.
Id. See also Comment, Jury Trials for Juveniles: Rhetoric and Reality, 8 PAC. L.J.
811 (1977); 45 TENN. L. REV. 534 (1978) (general discussion concerning jury trials for
juvenile offenders).
57. See 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 55, at 89.
58. Kent v. United States, 386 U.S. at 554.
59. 24 Cal. 3d at 395, 595 P.2d at 105, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
60. Id. at 400, 595 P.2d at 108, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
61. See note 25 supra. Because the United States Supreme Court has not de
cided this particular issue, the states have great latitude in broadening, as well as re
stricting, the application of the fourth amendment as it pertains to juveniles.
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ing while the fifth amendment rights attach during the hearing.
Since the decision in Gault extended the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination during the adjudicatory phase,62 it is con
sistent to permit the inclusion of similar fourth amendment rights
where evidence was 'obtained prior to the hearing. 63 The fact that
recent United States Supreme Court decisions 64 have expanded
the minor's substantive due process rights of privacy provides addi
tional impetus for suggesting that the corresponding procedural
rights also should be broadened.
The California court can base its acceptance of this position on
both the growing trend of state court holdings favoring extension65
and the California court's own recent sub silentio holding in the
case of In re Tony C.66 In Tony C., the court ruled that a minor
suspected of receiving stolen property and committing rape could
not legally be detained without reasonable cause. 67 The decision in
Scott K. follows as a logically consistent corollary to the principle
implicitly held in Tony C. and enables California to provide minors
with fourth amendment protections despite the absence of a defini
tive United States Supreme Court mandate. 68

III. PARENTAL AUTHORITY AND DUE PROCESS
A second issue raised in Scott K. concerns the role of the par
ent with regard to the extension of fourth amendment rights to mi
nors. Federal case law indicates that certain limitations are placed
upon the preferred position that parents enjoy over their chil
dren. 69 While parents reign supreme in their households, the gov
ernment has a viable interest in protecting minors engaged in pub

62. See notes 42-49 supra and accompanying text.
63. See 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 55, at 59.
64. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977) (minors
have the right to own contraceptives without parental consent); Planned Parenthood
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72-74 (1976) (minors have the right to terminate their preg
nancies without parental interference).
65. See State v. Lowry, 95 N.J. Super. 307, 313-17, 230 A.2d 907, 910-12 (Law
Div. 1967); In re Williams, 49 Misc. 2d 154, 169-70,267 N.Y.S.2d 91, 109-10 (Ulster
City Fam. Ct. 1966); In re Morris, 29 Ohio Misc. 71, 72,278 N.E.2d 701, 702 (1971);
In re Harvey, 222 Pa. Super. 222, 228, 295 A.2d 93, 96-97 (1972); Cuilla v. State, 434
S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). See also note 50 supra.
66. 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978).
67. Id. at 892-94, 582 P.2d at 961-63, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 370-72.
68. 24 Cal. 3d at 402-03, 595 P.2d at 108-09, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 674-75.
69. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
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lic activity. The United States Supreme Court has maintained this
dichotomy by upholding the rights of parents to bring up their
children 70 and to direct their education.71 Only when children
were exploited in the public sector did the state rush to their de
fense. 72 Since these decisions were rendered prior to In re
Gault,73 they tended to support notions inherent in the concept of
parens patriae.
The apparent effect of recent decisions 74 that have expanded
the substantive due process rights of minors has been to reduce
the scope of parental authority in the home. 75 As a practical mat
ter, the addition of these rights has lessened the degree to which
parents can place demands upon their offspring. These develop
ments troubled Justice Clark, who, in his dissenting opinion in
Scott K., voiced concern that the decision would seriously impede
parents' right to maintain discipline over their children: "[a] parent
who, as in this case, has reasonable grounds to believe that a minor
child is engaged in serious criminal activity, must be allowed to in
vestigate that belief. ... [T]he [resulting] search is justified as con
duct in aid of the parental power of care and discipline. "76
The majority of the court attempted to dissipate these fears by
distinguishing a warrantless police search from a private one on the
basis of whether state action was present. 77 Since the application of

70. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
71. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
72. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968); Prince v. Massa
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-70 (1944). These two cases curtail the rights of parents
over their children when the state has a dominant interest in protecting their
health and safety. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972); note 22 su
pra and accompanying text. The power of the parent is limited to the extent that "it
appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or
have a potential for significant social burdens." ld. at 234.
73. 387 U.S. at 1.
74. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
75. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1977); Planned
I>arenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976). Both of these decisions reflect
normal parental concerns which, until recently, have been decided in the private do
mestic domain.
The court in Scott K. failed to consider the question of substantive rights of pri
vacy. Apparently, the court feared that such an approach would sufficiently restrict
parents from investigating their child's wrongdoing. See 24 Cal. 3d at 403 n.8, 595
P.2d at 109 n.8, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 675 n.86. See also notes 107-15 infra and accom
panying text.
76. 24 Cal. 3d at 406-07, 595 P.2d at 112, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 678 (Clark, J., dis
senting).
77. ld. at 400 n.2, 595 P.2d at 107 n.2, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 673 n.2.
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constitutional protections requires the existence of state action,78 it
is essential to determine who initiated the search. In the case of
Scott K., no state action was apparent in the mother's search of the
desk drawer; therefore, the evidence seized was admissible. 79 The
search of the toolbox, however, was initiated by the police. Since
state action was present, any tainted evidence would be excluded
from the judicial proceeding. 80 When viewed in this light, the de
cision does not compromise the parents' ability to investigate their
child's wrongdoing. The extension of the fourth amendment to mi
nors merely places an additional check upon unwarranted state in
terference. This only serves to protect the child from the im
proprieties of the police, not from the well-intentioned aims of
his parents.
Justice Clark's dissent implied that parents would be power
less to deal with complicated social problems if they were pre
cluded from working in concert with police. 81 The justice con
doned this cooperative effort by supporting his argument with an
agency theory: "[w]hat the father could do himself, he could do by
an agent, whether that agent be a locksmith or a policeman. "82 Ac
cording to Justice Clark, the action by police was no different than
the policy which permits school officials to search school lockers
under a theory of in loco parentis. 83
Despite the dissent's assertions to the contrary, there are two
major distinctions between an administrative school search and a
police search of a private residence. School officials have an identi
fiable interest in a school locker:84 lacking a warrant, police have
no such interest in a private home. Additionally, under California
law, school officials are recognized as private individuals. Since

78. See generally Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). Evidence ob
tained in a private search is admissible even though the search may have been un
reasonable. This is so because the constitutional safeguards protect individuals
against state action, and not private action. Id. See also People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d
434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). Under California law, evidence obtained in unreasonable
searches by state officials is inadmissible in criminal proceedings. Id.
79. 24 Cal. 3d at 398-99, 595 P.2d at 106-07, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 672-73.
80. Id. at 405, 595 P.2d at 1l0, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 675. See notes 7 & 13 supra.
81. 24 Cal. 3d at 407-08, 595 P.2d at 112, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 678 (Clark, J., dis
senting).
82. Id.
83. Id. In loco parentis is a theory by which school officials are delegated pa
rental powers. See generally Brooks v. Jacobs, 139 Me. 371, 31 A.2d 414 (1943).
84. See In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 510-12, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220,
221-22 (1969).
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state action is not present, their searches are not conducted under
the scope of constitutional protections. 85
In Scott K., the extension of fourth amendment rights actually
imposes a benign effect upon parental power. Parents are not ham
pered in their ability to investigate wrongdoing since they, like
school officials, can circumvent due process requirements by pro
viding police with the evidence they seize. If parents choose not to
involve the police, they still retain the power to govern their
child's behavior. While it was not apparent in Scott K., it seems
that the extension of fourth amendment rights would reduce police
involvement and would foster the resolution of domestic disputes.
IV.

THIRD-PARTY CONSENT

The final issue discussed by the court in Scott K. concerns the
extent to which parents, as third parties, can consent to a search of
their child's belongings. Consent searches86 have gained favor in
recent years as the United States Supreme Court has attempted to
provide police with greater investigatory powers. The current test
to determine whether authority exists to allow a third party to
consent to a search was derived from the combined rationales of
two Supreme Court decisions: Frazier v. CUpp 87 and United States
v. Matlock. 88 In Frazier, the Court departed from the broad provi
sions of the exclusionary rule by permitting one party to consent to
the search of a duffelbag which he shared with defendant. 89 The
Court upheld the search despite the fact that the consenting party
possessed only half the items in the bag. The Court, in allowing
one party to authorize the search, reasoned that defendant had as
sumed the risk that a third party would consent to a search of the
jointly shared bag. 90
In Matlock, the Court fashioned a standard for determining
when a defendant had assumed this risk. The test evaluated
whether the third party maintained common authority over the

85. ld. See also In re Christopher W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 780, 105 Cal. Rptr.
775, 777 (1973).
86. Third-party consent searches are those in which third parties give police
permission to investigate activity to which the defendant had not previously agreed.
See generally Comment, Third-Party Consent Searches: An Alternative Analysis, 41
U. CHI. L. REV. 121 (1973); 41 TENN. L. REV. 923 (1974).
87. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
88. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
89. 394 U.S. at 740. See also note 7 supra.
90. 394 U.S. at 740.
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items to be inspected. 91 Common authority was measured by the
degree of access or control which the consenting party had with re
spect to the searched item. Under the Matlock standard, a mere
property interest was insufficient to permit consent unless it was
demonstrated that actual control was exerted over the item's use. 92
California cases decided prior to Matlock were consistent with this
approach. 93
The court of appeals failed to apply the Matlock test to the
facts of Scott K. The facts indicate that Scott objected to the search
when the police requested the keys to the toolbox. 94 Scott pos
sessed the only key to the box, and his father readily admitted that
his son maintained sole control over its contents. 95 There were no
indications of any mutual use of the toolbox. Furthermore, the
court of appeals agreed that "if the son had been an adult, the fa
ther would have had no right to consent to the opening and search
ing of the locked toolbox."96 Presumably, the father's consent
would not have satisfied the Matlock test in the absence of the
parent-child relationship.
The threshold question in Scott K. is whether parents possess
rights greater than those announced in Matlock. In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Clark indicated that parents do enjoy greater
rights. The justice voiced his support97 of the result reached in
Vandenberg v. Superior Court,98 a California appellate court deci
sion which followed a theory of consent premised upon the dispar
ity of rights between parent and child. 99 In Vandenberg, the appel
late court permitted a father, who shared a bedroom with his son,
to consent to a search of their room as well as to a search of his

91. 415 U.S. at 171.
92. See note 24 supra.
93. People v. Cruz, 61 Cal. 2d 861, 395 P.2d 889, 40 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1964)
(apartment guests could not consent to search of property of others jointly residing
there); People v. Daniels, 16 Cal. App. 3d 36, 93 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1971) (mother could
not consent to search of adult son's suitcase); People v. Egan, 250 Cal. App. 2d 433,
58 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1967) (stepfather's consent was invalid in search of adult stepson's
personal effects found in stepfather's bedroom); People v. Murillo, 241 Cal. App. 2d
173, 50 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1966) (roommate's consent to search residence was not valid
with regard to the search of an attache case).
94. 24 Cal. 3d at 399, 595 P.2d at 107, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
95. Id.
96. 142 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
97. 24 Cal. 3d at 407-08, 595 P.2d at 112, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
98. 8 Cal. App. 3d 1048, 87 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1970).
99. Id. at 1055, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
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son's personal effects.loo Justice Clark incorporated this position in
his opinion: "a father may grant permission to enter and search a
bedroom jointly occupied by the father and his son and such
consent is valid although the son may protest the search. "101
In the context of the present case, Justice Clark's reliance on
the decision reached in Vandenberg is misplaced for several rea
sons. First, Vandenberg was decided prior to the federal ruling in
Matlock and after a significant number of California decisions
adhering to a theory of mutual use. 102 Second, the case of People
v. Daniels,103 decided a year after Vandenberg, invalidated a
consent search by a mother who allowed police to search her son's
locked suitcase. 104 The decision in Daniels is significant because it
asserts the validity of the Matlock principle as a narrowly construed
guideline under California law. Third, state law prohibits parents
from waiving their children's constitutional guarantees. lOS If par
ents are unable to deny the existence of their children's rights,
then the Vandenberg rationale is necessarily limited in both scope
and effect. Finally, California law permits children to own property
independently of their parents. 106 Such law would have no mean

[d. at 1053-55,87 Cal. Rptr. at 879-80.
101. 24 Cal. 3d at 408, 595 P.2d at 112, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 678 (Clark, J., dis
senting).
102. See generally note 83 supra and accompanying text; see also People v.
Nunn, 55 Ill. 2d 344, 304 N.E.2d 81 (1973) (adult son locked himself in his room in
an effort to resist his mother's consent search, exclusive occupancy was demon
strated, and the evidence obtained was inadmissible); People v. Flowers, 23 Mich.
App. 523, 179 N.W.2d 56 (1970) (minor was being tried as an adult, and the court re
jected the argument of parental supremacy, finding that the father could not give
consent when he had no personal involvement in the suspected crime).
Arguably this theory of parental prerogative is similar to the agency theory the
United States Supreme Court dispensed with in Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483
(1964). In Stoner, the Court denied the right of a hotel clerk to consent to a search of
a guest's room on a theory of agency. "[Tlhe rights protected by the Fourth Amend
ment are not to be eroded by strained applications of the law of agency or by
unrealistic doctrines of 'apparent authority.' " [d. at 488.
103. 16 Cal. App. 3d 36, 93 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1971).
104. Id. at 42-45, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 631-33.
105. See In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298
(1977) (due process rights of a 14-year-old cannot be waived by parents when child
is subject to being committed to mental hospital); In re Ricky H., 2 Cal. 3d 513, 468
P.2d 204, 86 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1970) (parents may not influence minor's right to counsel
by threatening not to pay the expenses).
106. See Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 432, 289 P.2d 218, 225 (1955) ("a mi
nor child's property is his own and not that of his parents"). See also Estate ofYano,
188 Cal. 645, 206 P. 995 (1922).
100.
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ing if parental rights over the item in dispute were held to be su
perior to the child's rights.· By granting fourth amendment rights to
minors, the ruling in Scott K. operates to defeat any theory of
consent which gives deference to parental standing.
V.

LEGAL PARAMETERS

The California Supreme Court's holding in Scott K. gives rise
to several generalizations. First, in order for a child to negate the
consent of any third party, he must establish an absolute property
interest in the item in question. In the home setting, it is arguable
that a particular room may be shared by various family members
and, therefore, a search of the room is not immune from third
party consent. 107 Since children may own property found within a
room, it is likely that such personalized items would not be subject
to the consent waiver. lOS
Second, if the child is present and objects to the search of an
item of mutual use, the decision in Scott K. implies that parental
consent would not outweigh the child's objections. 109 Cases which
hold to the contraryllO premise their result upon the disparity of
rights between parent and child. 111 In view of the decisions ren
dered in Daniels 112 and Scott K., such reasoning is no longer tena
ble under California law.
Finally, if the child is absent during the search of an item of
mutual use, the implication is that the consent would be valid un

107. This is especially so if the room is shared with a sibling or a parent, as in
Vandenberg v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. App. 3d at 1048, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 876. Some ju
risdictions have decided that parental authority reigns supreme even after the deci
sion in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 164. See State v. Cook, 345 So. 2d 29
(La. 1977); Nelson v. State, 564 P.2d 254 (Okla. 1977).
The search of other rooms which serve as common rooms can be consented to by
parents. See People v. Simmons, 49 Mich. App. 80, 211 N.W.2d 247 (1973) (dining
room); People v. Bunker, 22 Mich. App. 396, 177 N.W.2d 644 (1970) (basement). Nei
ther of these two decisions would be affected by the result reached in Matlock.
108. See People v. Daniels, 16 Cal. App. 3d 36, 93 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1971) (suit
case); People v. Murillo, 241 Cal. App. 2d 173, 50 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1966) (attache
case).
109. 24 Cal. 3d at 404, 595 P.2d at 110, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 676.
110. See State v. Clemons, 27 Ariz. App. 193, 552 P.2d 1208 (1976); In Interest
of Salyer, 44 Ill. App. 3d 854, 358 N.E.2d 1333 (1977); Tate v. State, 32 Md. App.
613,363 A.2d 622 (1976).
Ill. See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 55, ~ 11.7, at 733-34.
112. See notes 93 & 94 supra and accompanying text.
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der an assumption of risk theory.1l 3 If the item is not subject to
mutual use, then any third-party consent to the search is invalid.
A related problem which may arise concerns the issue of
whether the child lacks the capacity to exercise his rights.
Arguably, the fourth amendment rights extended to children are
not the same as those extended to adults because some children
will lack the capacity to appreciate the nature of their rights. Such
a position is not persuasive. Capacity, like common authority, is an
issue dependent upon the particular facts of each case. The fact
that an individual child may lack the capacity to exercise his rights
should not affect the entire class of minors any more than a senile
adult's inability to assert his rights should affect other senior citi
zens whose mental faculties are unimpaired. California law has in
dicated that a child as young as thirteen years old may consent to a
search of his parent's home. U4 Certainly, a child who could exer
cise the right to consent could also exercise the right to deny
consent. It must be the responsibility of the courts to closely scru
tinize those situations in which a child has capacity but the par
ent's waiver of the protected right works to the child's ultimate dis
advantage.
VI.

CONCLUSION

- The California Supreme Court's decision in Scott K. broad
ened the minor's rights vis-a-vis the state without unduly re
stricting the parent-child relationship. By minimizing unwarranted
state interference, the decision may well encourage families to re
solve juvenile problems among themselves. The limitation placed
upon the parental right to consent to the search of a child's posses
sions is, in effect, an illusory one since the child's fourth amend
ment rights may be circumvented if the parent initiates the
search. u5
The most Significant aspect of the decision, however, lies in
the California Supreme Court's willingness to join other state juris
dictions in extending to minors rights which the United States
Supreme Court has failed to consider. U6 By granting fourth

113. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969); notes 87-90 supra and ac
companying text.
114. In re Robert H., 78 Cal. App. 3d 894, 144 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1978).
115. See notes 79 & 80 supra and accompanying text.
116. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
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amendment protection to minors while withholding the criminal
sanctions applicable to adults, the courts will be able to assess real
istically whether the evolving system of juvenile justice accurately
satisfies the corrective needs of the child.
Albert N. Kapin

